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ABSTRACT
Mobile payments support a range of services in many less de-
veloped countries including everyday payments, migrant re-
mittances, credit, tax collection, and welfare benefits. These
services depend entirely on the mobile phone network as
their carrier, so they stop where the network does. This
leaves millions of the very poorest people stranded – people
living in remote areas where there is little to no network
service. It also leaves urban users at the mercy of network
congestion.
We developed a prototype system, DigiTally, which lets users
make oﬄine payments by copying short strings of digits from
one mobile handset to another. Oﬄine payments are already
used for electricity (both in prepayment meters and pay-as-
you-go solar); can we extend them into a general-purpose
payment system, to increase service resilience in the face of
network congestion or outage, and provide service to cur-
rently excluded areas?
We report the results of a preliminary study with an early
prototype of DigiTally, tested on participants from a univer-
sity in Nairobi (Kenya). The code-sharing process presented
a possible usability challenge. To explore this and other as-
pects of an early prototype, DigiTally was introduced to
Kenyan participants in order to resolve any major issues be-
fore a later field trial.
We discuss the lessons learned from our field visits and initial
evaluation; we hope that this contribution is helpful for re-
searchers and policy makers interested in mobile payments
and financial inclusion. We also present our findings and
observations. We found that, although oﬄine payments in-
volve copying codes in both directions between the payer’s
phone and the payee’s, the extra workload was acceptable
to most users.
Copyright is held by the author/owner. Permission to make digital or hard
copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted
without fee.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile payments have transformed the lives of millions in
less developed countries, bringing a means of exchange and
a store of value to people who did not previously use a bank
account or who lived far from any bank branch. They run
on top of a mobile phone network; a user can typically load
their phone with credit at the same agent where they buy
airtime, and can send money to other service users. Over
200 such services have been launched worldwide and about
20 have achieved serious scale1; one pioneer was Kenya’s
M-Pesa [11], operated by the local phone company Safari-
com. The initial killer application was migrant remittances,
but M-Pesa is now very widely used for everyday purchases
as well as specialist applications from paying pensions and
government farm subsidies to collecting business taxes [12].
Because of the strong positive effect on development, the
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation called for innovations that
could increase the uptake of mobile payments2. One of the
largest impediments is that current systems operate entirely
online; both the payer and the payee have to be able to
communicate with the payment system server for a payment
to be completed. This excludes millions of people living in
remote areas with no network service; such people make up
10-40% of the population depending on the country. It also
makes payments harder in the event of network congestion
(we have observed 30-second delays in down-town Nairobi).
Additionally, where the payment service operator is not the
same firm as the mobile network operator, charges become
an issue.
The main contribution of this paper is to describe a pre-
liminary study that took place at Strathmore University in
Nairobi, in September 2016. We set out to establish whether
DigiTally was usable in three different environments: a cof-
fee shop, a campus bookshop, and a cafeteria, and by stu-
dents from a range of backgrounds. These students were
experienced users of M-Pesa and thus able to compare it
1As shown on GSMA’s ‘Mobile for Development’ website
(using the Mobile Money filter): http://www.gsma.com/
mobilefordevelopment/tracker
2Enable Universal Acceptance of Mobile Money Payments:
https://gcgh.grandchallenges.org/challenge/enable-
universal-acceptance-mobile-money-payments-round-
14
with DigiTally; we also got assessments from the checkout
staff. Further contributions are as follows: the paper anal-
yses a security technology and offers lessons learned from a
preliminary usability study. The paper should be of interest
to researchers interested in development, and also to those
interested in evaluating payment systems; both communi-
ties can benefit from our insights. Documenting the study
in one publication should help them and others interested
in this type of research.
We discuss the background and related work in section 2.
We describe the technology in section 3, and we discuss our
method and results in sections 4 and 5. We describe our
observations in section 6, and provide more discussion in
section 7. Finally, we present our conclusions in section 8.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
Modern mobile payment systems in less developed countries
rely on encrypted Short Message Service (SMS) messages or
Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD) sessions,
supported by a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card is-
sued by a phone company. Examples include M-Pesa in
Kenya [11] and bKash in Bangladesh [21, 5]. The SIM can
verify a user PIN and contains keys for authenticating the
customer; it can thus establish secure communication with a
payment server. The server keeps everyone’s transaction his-
tories, just like in a conventional bank. Customers can check
their balance and make payments using menu options on
the phone’s screen, displayed by the trusted SIM card. The
phone number doubles as a bank account number. Cash-
in and cash-out services are provided to customers by the
mobile payment operator to facilitate exchanging fiat cur-
rency into electronic float and vice versa. These services are
operated by a network of mobile money agents, who earn
commissions based on the services provided (e.g. withdraw-
ing funds from the system incurs a fee). To make a payment,
a customer first enters the merchant’s phone number (shops
have numbers prominently displayed, with large shops hav-
ing short codes). The customer must then enter the amount,
followed by their PIN to authorise the transaction. A pay-
ment message is sent to the server; if the funds are available,
they are transferred, and the merchant is informed. The
merchant knows when the money has been received because
their phone pings.
Jack and Suri discussed the economics of M-Pesa in [12],
highlighting issues that affected system uptake, including
liquidity and network reliability. Zimmerman and Baur dis-
cuss the challenges facing financial inclusion efforts [23], in-
cluding network coverage and reliability, liquidity, complex-
ity of user interfaces and payment processes, the lack of dis-
pute resolution, and the lack of customer protection against
fraud. Dupas et al. report that a significant proportion of
the participants in their study listed fraud (embezzlements),
unreliable services, and transaction fees as issues [9].
The goal of our work is to tackle the network coverage and
unreliable services problems by processing payments oﬄine
reliably and deterministically, and to simplify the user inter-
face as much as possible by mimicking familiar mobile pay-
ment systems. Furthermore, we aim to decrease transaction
fees to encourage users to process transactions electronically.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate possible usabil-
ity challenges to be addressed in subsequent versions of our
prototype. Oﬄine payment systems have already been im-
plemented, such as Geldkarte3 in Germany and Net1/UEPS
[1] in South Africa, but require dedicated devices or un-
familiar hardware that can be costly to replace if lost or
stolen. Similar systems might perhaps be implemented on
modern smartphones if both the payer and the payee had
them. However, most users in less developed countries still
use feature phones that do not have NFC, Bluetooth, or
cameras; these phones cannot communicate data automat-
ically in the absence of a network. We also minimise the
assumptions we make regarding what features are available
on users’ phones.
Our goal is to design a system that operates without relying
on such features, in case some of them are inoperable. For
example, if we rely on a camera and it is damaged, the entire
system is useless until the user has their camera fixed. By
operating within these constraints, we are able to design a
system that works on all low-end mobile devices; our project
aims to provide a solution for the poorest demographics.
The use of feature phones emerged as a requirement during
trips to rural Kenya. Users in Busia county, for example,
specifically requested solutions that work on feature phones.
One person commented: “Don’t give us [systems that work
on] smartphones. We don’t have those things and we don’t
know how to use them.” When asked what kind of phones
users owned, all but one person (in a group of more than 20),
held up a feature phone; the non-feature phone was an old
BlackBerry. Reliance on feature phones (called ‘kabambes’
in Kenya) is due to both battery life and cost (in terms of
price as well as maintenance). With such constraints, the
only way to transfer information oﬄine is for one phone to
display it, and for a human to type it into the other phone (a
similar approach used in device-pairing methods). Kainda
et al. [13] looked at the tradeoff of usability and security
with regards to different device-pairing methods, using out-
of-band channels, as it applies to various device usage or ca-
pability restrictions. Their results show that typing strings
(“copy & enter”) ranked first in terms of the aforementioned
tradeoff. They also recommend that system designers take
into account factors that affect that tradeoff including user
conditioning, user motivation, security failures, and atten-
tiveness. Moreover, transferring value by copying digits is
well established in other applications, such as prepayment
electricity meters [2].
3. TECHNOLOGY
An early design goal we set was that DigiTally must not
require users to operate any unfamiliar hardware, and that
the transaction flow should be as close as possible to the fa-
miliar one. This leads immediately to the challenge of pro-
gramming feature phones: different operating systems make
it difficult to implement and test applications for various
models, leading to large costs for maintenance and support.
To minimise these costs within our constraints, the practical
approach is to program the SIM card in the user’s phone.
SIMs were designed to host multiple applets in secure con-
tainers, which can prevent one applet from accessing other
applets’ data. A SIM provides a secure environment that
we can control and that is compatible with all mobile de-
vices adhering to the Global System for Mobile Communica-
tions (GSM) and smartcard interoperability standards. This
3Geldkarte website: https://geldkarte.de/
Figure 1: An overlay SIM (top) and a regular SIM
(bottom). The top part of the overlay SIM can be
peeled off and stuck on top of a regular SIM
means that we can program our system on a SIM, and insert
it into any device that accepts a SIM. The user can move
the SIM from one device to another, allowing for portabil-
ity. SIMs also provide valuable built-in features, including
atomic operations and rollback mechanisms, as well as the
ability to store secure tokens and cryptographic keys in a
tamper-resistant chip.
Feature phones normally have a single SIM slot already
taken by the SIM issued by the Mobile Network Operator
(MNO). MNOs do not generally let anyone else program
their SIMs, but there is a new technology that can be used
to circumvent this restriction. This is the overlay SIM (or
sticker SIM): a SIM card only 120 microns thick that can
be inserted between the regular SIM card and the phone.
Figure 1 shows an overlay SIM and a regular SIM. Overlay
SIMs were developed to support low-cost mobile roaming.
They can also be used as a proof-of-concept prototyping en-
vironment, and to bypass MNOs’ restrictions on devices if
necessary. We used the programmable overlay SIM as a reg-
ular SIM, inserted in the single SIM slot. The same overlay
SIM can also be stuck on top of an existing non-overlay SIM,
and our system will work seamlessly on the device while al-
lowing it to still work as a phone4.
3.1 Overview of DigiTally
We designed and developed DigiTally as a Java card ap-
plet accessed through a user’s phone (Figure 2). This ap-
plet can be loaded on an overlay SIM or a regular SIM. We
chose to use a regular SIM for this study (for reasons we
discuss in section 4.4 item 2). As discussed earlier, having
an overlay-SIM ready applet enables deployment on feature
phones even if the MNO chooses not to install DigiTally on
their own regular SIM.
Rather than asking participants to use their own phones, we
provided participants with dedicated phones (Nokia 130),
preloaded with a SIM that included the DigiTally applet.
The applet includes a menu that mimics existing mobile pay-
ment systems to capitalise on users’ familiarity with them.
The applet offers the user options such as Balance, Send
Money, and Receive Money (Figure 3). Figures 8 and 9 il-
lustrate the steps required to complete a transaction.
4Overlays SIMs are used in China for roaming purposes,
and in Kenya by a local Bank to provide financial services
to their users and to break local phone-payment monopolies.
Overlay SIMs work on standard carriers’ SIMs.
Figure 2: Selecting DigiTally applet from the feature
phone’s application menu
Figure 3: DigiTally user interface on a feature phone
The icon for the applet displayed in Figure 2 is enforced
through the mobile OS. When a single SIM is present, se-
lecting the SIM icon will display the applets that reside on
that SIM. When multiple SIMs are present, such as in the
case of using an overlay SIM on top of a regular SIM, se-
lecting the SIM icon directs the user to two different menu
options that represent the applet names in the two SIMs.
Note that there could be more than one menu option dis-
played after selecting the SIM icon, if one or both of the
SIMs offer more than one applet.
There are two main differences between traditional mobile
payment systems and DigiTally. The first difference is that
the SIM in an oﬄine payment system stores the balance as a
value counter, and the payment protocol changes this local
balance in the SIM, whereas a traditional mobile payment
system merely sends requests to a backend system to process
operations on the user’s balance. The second difference is
the Receive Money option: in the absence of an online pay-
ment server, the recipient must be involved in completing
a transaction. In traditional mobile payment systems, the
recipient is not actively involved; they merely get an SMS
saying how much money has arrived and from where. In
oﬄine payments, both phones must be involved in a trans-
action. The protocol is designed so that the parties learn im-
mediately whether the transaction has failed or completed.
Note that DigiTally does not require data to be sent over
the network and can, therefore, work completely oﬄine.
The technical description of the DigiTally protocol [4] de-
scribes the cryptography and other security mechanisms ([4]
does not include a description of the design or implementa-
tion of DigiTally). For the purposes of this paper, we focus
on the codes exchanged by the users to complete transac-
tions. These are Message Authentication Codes (MACs)
that establish agreement between the payer and the payee
on the transaction details, namely the payer, the payee, and
the amount. These codes are computed using secret keys
kept in their SIM cards based on the transaction inputs and
previous history, and are designed to prevent transaction
manipulation, replay, or guessing.
3.2 DigiTally Codes
We now outline the stages required to complete a DigiTally
transaction. There are two codes involved in completing a
transaction. To simplify the discussion, we will assume that
Alice is paying Bob.
1. Code1: After the payee B (Bob) has entered into his
SIM the transaction amount X and the phone number
of the payer A (Alice)5, his SIM generates a random
nonce (NB), and then computes a MAC on A, B, NB ,
X and the log of previous transactions ` between the
two parties6. This MAC and the nonce together make
up the 8-digit Code1, which is shown on the payee’s de-
vice (Figure 4). Alice similarly enters into her phone
the amount X and Bob’s number B7; it prompts her
for Code1, which she enters (Figure 5). If the two
parties agree on X, ` and each others’ identity, then
Alice’s phone accepts Code1. If there’s a disagreement
– whether due to attempted cheating or an honest mis-
take – her phone will generate an error8.
2. Code2: If Code1 is correct, Alice’s SIM card decre-
ments her account’s available balance by the transac-
tion amount X and generates Code2 to authenticate
the transaction. Code2 is also 8 digits long; it consists
of a 4-digit nonce NA generated by Alice’s SIM and
4 digits from a MAC on A, B, X, ` and NB . Alice
then shows or tells Code2 to Bob (Figure 6). He en-
ters Code2 into his phone, and, if it is valid, his SIM
increments his balance by X and a transaction log is
displayed on his phone (Figure 7). A similar transac-
tion log is shown to Alice to confirm the completion of
the transaction (decrementing her balance by X).
This is the simplest payment protocol we could devise that
enables value to be transferred from Alice’s card to Bob’s by
copying 8 digits in one direction and 8 digits in the other.
Its security is analysed and discussed in [4]. Here, our focus
is usability; the STS prepayment electricity meters widely
used in Kenya transfer value by means of a 20-digit number,
presented as five groups of four digits [2]. A householder
buys codes from an ATM or sales agent and copies them into
their electricity meter; codes can also be bought online, using
5In our trial, user identities are randomly generated num-
bers, each simulating a phone number.
6If no previous transactions exist, then the first transaction
initialises the relationship between the two parties.
7Alice and Bob can pick each others’ names from a menu.
The first transaction stores the contact’s details, and sub-
sequent transaction can later retrieve information from the
locally saved contacts (on the phone or SIM).
8For example, if Alice enters $4 on her device, and Bob
enters $5, then Bob’s Code1 will generate an error on Alice’s
device. The same thing happens if the wrong phone number
is selected.
Figure 4: Bob’s phone displays Code1 that must be
given to Alice
Figure 5: Alice enters Code1 into her phone
Figure 6: Alice’s phone displays the response code
(Code2), given to Bob to authorise the payment
Figure 7: Bob’s phone displays the transaction log
after accepting Code2
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Figure 8: Recipient’s (Bob B) transaction steps
M-Pesa. Thus, we know that our prospective customers can
copy digits, and that even illiterate people can use a phone.
The object of the study is to establish whether the DigiTally
transaction flow is usable.
Some care is necessary to ensure robustness in the face of
mistakes. The DigiTally implementation includes various
segments that execute atomic operations (enforced by the
Java card platform) to ensure that critical components of
the payment protocol are fully executed (or reverted to their
initial state if a problem occurs). This provides the ability to
reliably create checkpoints. We checkpoint the transaction
when Code1 is successfully generated so that a transaction
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Figure 9: Payer’s (Alice A) transaction steps
can be recovered if, for example, a merchant accidentally
generates a second, new Code1 before the customer replies to
the first one. Additionally, as Alice’s balance is decremented
prior to displaying Code2 on the payer’s device, we have to
ensure that if she is interrupted (e.g. by a flat battery), her
SIM can still retrieve Code2 later (Code2 is saved in the final
checkpoint of the transaction, and can be retrieved from the
“last transaction” log). Checkpointing was also tested (see
section 6.2).
DigiTally codes do not have to be kept secret, since the codes
can be used only once and only by the payer and payee
in a specific transaction. There is no added risk if other
users observe the transaction or overhear the codes being
exchanged verbally. This is in contrast to mobile payment
systems that rely on secret codes: codes that compromise
the users’ security if intercepted, and increase the burden
on the payer to deliver them to the recipient out-of-band.
Users of feature phones can’t use a secure messaging service,
so probably have to use voice or SMS and hope for the best.
As well as the (small) technical fraud risk, such codes can
create anxiety and make dispute resolution problematic.
4. METHOD
The usability evaluation of DigiTally was conducted by the
primary researcher from the University of Cambridge (UK)
and researchers from Strathmore University (Kenya), in early
September 2016. Participants from Strathmore University
(hereafter referred to as ‘the university’) performed real-
world transactions using DigiTally and then answered ques-
tions about their experience. As well as open ended-questions,
we make use of the System Usability Scale (SUS), which is
a standardised tool widely used for measuring usability. We
give details below.
4.1 Participants
We wanted to test the technology as part of a pilot, and
so we needed participants who could reveal weaknesses in
our design before testing it as part of a field study with a
representative sample. The aim was to maximise usability
before introducing DigiTally in a larger-scale field test with
target users. As an initial trial to establish any major is-
sues with the DigiTally system itself, we recruited Kenyan
participants from the university.
The participants were recruited following their registered in-
terest in the study in response to an advertisement. Poten-
tial participants were interviewed with an aim to achieve
diversity in terms of demographics, and to establish that
participants would be able to give us detailed feedback to
inform major re-designs before a field trial with a represen-
tative sample of rural users.
Twelve students and seven merchant staff were recruited as
participants to use DigiTally for five days. Merchants were
recruited from the university’s cafeteria, bookshop, and a
local coffee shop. According to Sauro [18], Vizri [22] and
Nielsen and Landauer [16], very few participants are needed
for early phase usability studies such as this, since adding
more users tends to uncover the same issues, with ‘five’ of-
ten referenced as the “magic number” of participants. Con-
fidence intervals may be wide as a result, but the average
SUS score should be stable [17].
For wider coverage, we included a greater variety of par-
ticipants, which required larger numbers than the proposed
“magic number 5”. This is in line with more cautious esti-
mates of 10-20 participants for a usability test (e.g. Faulkner
[10] and Macefield [15]).
In total, we had 19 participants for this preliminary study.
There were 7 female and 5 male students, who were study-
ing a range of topics in different faculties, including finance,
law, and information technology. As for the merchants, the
cafeteria included 1 female and 2 male staff members; the
bookshop had 1 female and 2 males; and the local coffee shop
had 2 females (only one of whom was responsible for process-
ing DigiTally transactions). Each merchant was given one
feature phone to process DigiTally payments; staff members
in the cafeteria and bookshop shared the device to process
payments, while the coffee shop had one person operating
the feature phone.
Because we did not provide cash-in and cash-out services
(to convert physical currency to DigiTally balances, and
vice versa), participants were motivated to use DigiTally to
spend the balance they had in their SIMs.
4.2 Evaluation Materials
Questionnaires and surveys are one of the most widely used
methods for measuring attitudes [8]. They often involve
asking participants to select one of a number of points on
a rating (Likert) scale [20]. Good scales are valid (in that
they represent the intended construct), and reliable (giving
measurement consistency) [7, 20]. Standardised usability
questionnaires and surveys are preferred because they are
quantifiable, are economical to reuse, and allow for replica-
bility of findings [20]. The most popular standardised sur-
vey for measuring attitudes towards usability is the SUS,
favoured due to its brevity and being free to use [19]. The
items in this survey factor into two sub-constructs of us-
ability: system learnability (ease-of-use for new users), and
system usability (defined as ease-of-use more generally) [19].
It was important to use feature phones for this study rather
than the smartphones that many students normally use.
Participants were thus given identical feature phones to test
the basic usability of the technology first; a field test with
representative users in rural Kenya who already use feature
phones would be the next step.
We asked participants to complete a short pen and paper
survey, which included the SUS, to make an initial assess-
ment of DigiTally. Here, we asked participants for three
free-text responses, to get insights into how they viewed
DigiTally and where we might need to improve. These were:
1. What did you like about DigiTally?
2. What did you dislike about DigiTally?
3. Additional comments
4.3 Procedure
Students and on-campus merchants at the university were
invited to try DigiTally and to give their opinions of their
experience of the system. This involved using dedicated fea-
ture phones to transact using the DigiTally applet, which
was installed on each phone’s SIM. The students’ phones
were preloaded with a DigiTally balance of Ksh 2000 (about
$19.50) that could be used to make transactions with mer-
chant participants who accepted DigiTally. The merchants
(cafeteria, bookshop, and a local coffee shop) were given
phones that had a zero balance on their DigiTally applet.
Before the trial, participants gave informed written consent
and were shown how DigiTally works. After the trial, partic-
ipants were asked if they were willing to complete a survey
about their experience, which was entirely voluntary. This
survey consisted of the SUS and the three open-ended ques-
tions outlined in section 4.2 (Evaluation Materials).
Each day towards the end of business hours, the researchers
visited each merchant to check their balances and reimburse
them in cash the amount they had in their DigiTally balance
(after transferring the DigiTally balance to another phone,
and thus resetting a merchant’s balance to zero at the time
of reimbursement). Each merchant signed a form indicating
the date and amount of reimbursement. The reimbursement
forms were necessary to create a detailed accounting of the
money for our funders and auditors.
4.4 Ethics, Data Collection and Privacy
This study was approved by ethics committees at both uni-
versities involved in this research (one in the UK and the
other in Kenya). To address the various concerns raised by
the ethical review boards in both universities, we changed
the design of the study to minimise any possible risks:
1. Financial risks: to address the risk of possible loss
of personal funds, we provided the participants with a
preloaded amount into their DigiTally applet (as ex-
plained in section 4.3). We decided not to provide
cash-in and cash-out services to eliminate the possi-
bility that participants would use their own funds to
increase their DigiTally balances.
2. Privacy risks: we were asked for assurance that the
overlay SIM would not compromise the privacy of par-
ticipants by interfering with the participants’ regular
SIMs. Although we initially intended to use an over-
lay SIM on top of a regular SIM, we decided instead
to use the overlay as a regular SIM and provide users
with dedicated devices. The reason for this decision
is that proving that an overlay SIM is not compromis-
ing users’ privacy was out of the scope of this project.
Note that the overlay SIM (and the DigiTally applet)
does not compromise users’ privacy in our implemen-
tation, since it operates as an independent sandboxed
applet and does not interfere with other applets’ data
if there are any installed.
Therefore, we consider the preliminary study to have no sig-
nificant ethical implications. There were no known risks to
participants (financial, psychological, emotional, or physi-
cal). Participants were required to provide informed con-
sent before starting the study. The informed consent form
outlined what the study involved from the participant, how
long it would take, our commitment to confidentiality, and
their rights as a participant. Participants were reminded,
verbally and in the consent form, that their participation
was entirely voluntary, and that they may choose to not an-
swer particular or all questions and may withdraw from the
study at any point without having to provide a reason, and
without fear of penalty from the researchers.
This study did not involve deliberately deceiving partici-
pants in any way. This study also did not involve recruiting
participants from vulnerable groups, such as children, pa-
tients, people with learning disabilities, people engaged in
illegal activities, or people in custody. Participants were
fully debriefed and their questions were answered through-
out the study. Additionally, participants were given contact
information for all of the researchers from both universities
should they have any further enquiries.
The data we used for our evaluation includes the survey re-
sults, as well as the performance and transaction data pro-
cessed by the SIM. By collecting these data, we were able
to analyse performance and usability issues as we discuss in
Results (section 5). We collected the following:
1. Error rates (code-entry errors, and wrong PIN input)
2. Number of transactions
3. Number of attempts to unlock the SIM
4. Total amounts for all transactions (spent and received)
5. Transaction duration times
The SIM also stored the full log of the last transaction, which
is overwritten when a new transaction is successfully pro-
cessed9. This log contains Code2 which can be retrieved
after the transaction is completed. Recall that Code2 can
be used only once and with the right recipient (the iden-
tity of the recipient is one of the inputs required to generate
the code), but a user might want to retrieve Code2 in case
their battery goes flat before exchanging the code with the
recipient.
The collected data were stored in the SIM card (a trusted
tamper-proof element). DigiTally does not leak any in-
formation outside this trusted element. Therefore, perfor-
mance data are inaccessible without the correct authentica-
tor. Only pre-configured devices, programmed to provide
the correct authenticator, had access to the SIMs to obtain
the performance measurements. Each SIM was programmed
to lock itself after a certain number of failed attempts to ac-
cess the contents of the trusted tamper-proof environment.
At the completion of the preliminary study, we retrieved the
phones from all the participants to extract the performance
data from the SIMs and save it for later analysis. All the
stored data were encrypted after extraction.
With the exception of participant names, no Personally Iden-
tifiable Information (PII) were collected in the study (such
as date of birth, national ID numbers, etc.), as they were ir-
relevant to the scope of the study. We carefully explained to
all participants what data were being collected, by demon-
strating a full transaction on two phones and explaining the
performance variables to be measured for the purposes of
the preliminary study.
5. RESULTS
The following sections report on the actual error rates and
transaction times, as well as the SUS results. We present de-
scriptive statistics to help summarise the data and to show
any emerging patterns. We make no claims about statistical
significance, which would be reserved for inferential statis-
tics. This would not be appropriate since the tested popu-
lation do not represent the intended users of DigiTally, and
were recruited in order to reveal any major usability issues
with the technology itself. We thus make no claims about
generalisability of the results.
We also discuss the open-ended results and the lessons learned
through the feedback obtained from the users. We discuss
9This log is informational only, and is different from the
cryptographic parameters securely stored on the SIM and
used in the payment protocol as discussed in section 3.2.
Refer to [4] for more details.
the features that participants considered to be the most im-
portant, and indicate issues that may need to be re-evaluated
to improve usability.
Note that there is a difference between the total number of
transactions completed by students, and the total number of
transactions completed by merchants. This is due to the fact
that students moved funds between their phones, perhaps to
test the system and in some cases to demonstrate it to their
friends; moving funds between devices back and forth did
not incur any costs in terms of transaction fees.
5.1 Errors and Speed
Students completed an average of 23 transactions. The high-
est number of transactions completed by one participant was
30; the lowest was 8. For merchants, the average number of
transactions was 59. The highest number of transactions
completed by one merchant was 61; the lowest was 58. Ta-
bles 1 and 2 display a summary of the Error Rates and
Time on Task , which should be considered against the
number of transactions each participant successfully com-
pleted.
5.1.1 Error Rates
DigiTally captured the number of errors participants made
while trying to complete the task. Student participants
made the most errors when entering the first code (Code1)
presented to them by the merchant. The number of errors
here ranged from 0 to 9, with 7 of the 12 student partici-
pants making this error. These were non-critical errors since
they do not prevent successful completion of the transaction.
However, future trials will need to test the ease with which
users can recover from this and other errors. For Code2, the
number of errors ranged from 0 to 8, with 5 of the 12 student
participants making this error.
The merchant participants made the most errors when en-
tering Code2 which is required to authorise and complete the
transaction. The number of errors here ranged from 4 to 6.
Merchant M2’s Code2 errors were higher because they in-
cluded errors experienced during training. We adjusted the
number in the table to reflect the errors experienced during
the study without those experienced during the training.
Merchants made no Code1 errors; this type of error would
occur if they used DigiTally to make payments instead of
receiving (the merchants made a payment using DigiTally
for the daily reimbursement transactions, see section 4.3).
We include PIN errors in Tables 1 and 2 for completeness.
However, we do not consider entering PINs to be a great
problem, at least no more than in any other system that uses
them. For clarity, we report (in brackets) the proportion of
errors relative to the number of transactions completed as a
percentage (for non-zero values).
5.1.2 Time on Task
DigiTally recorded the time on task for each participant.
The transaction timer starts when a menu option is selected
(Send Money or Receive Money), and the timer is stopped
before the transaction log is displayed to the user (the trans-
action log includes the transaction’s duration time).
The average time for students to complete a transaction was
36.4 seconds. Their average completion times ranged from
24.2 seconds to 54.3 seconds. It is worth noting that a large
number of errors by a participant did not necessarily trans-
late into longer average time spent on transactions. For
the merchant participants, the average time to complete a
transaction was 51.23 seconds. Their average completion
times ranged from 40 to 69.8 seconds. Merchants’ transac-
tion times are larger since a merchant can start a transac-
tion, give Code1 to the payer, then complete a few tasks to
serve the customer until Code2 is entered. Such tasks in-
clude having to prepare food at the same time as processing
DigiTally payments, which is the case for merchant M3. For
merchants dedicated to processing payments (cashier roles),
the transaction times are lower (M1 and M2).
5.2 SUS Results
The SUS is not diagnostic: it will not reveal specific prob-
lems, but it does give an idea about overall ease-of-use, and
whether significant changes might be needed.
To give a clear idea of the results, the SUS is calculated so
as to provide a score out of 100. However, the SUS Score
is not a percentage. A score of 68 actually falls at the 50th
percentile (i.e. the average SUS score is 68). If the score is
below 68, there are likely to be serious usability problems
that need tackling. A score of 80.3 or higher is ideal.
The average SUS score for DigiTally was 78.8, which is con-
sidered ‘Good’, and would be given a ‘B+’ grade. The lowest
score was 50, which is considered ‘Poor’, and is equivalent to
a ‘F’ grade. This score was given by a merchant and was the
only score considered ‘Poor’ by SUS standards. The highest
score was 100, which is the best possible, and is equivalent
to an ‘A+’ grade. Eight participants gave the equivalent of
an ‘A+’ grade.
For merchant participants, the average SUS score was 71.4,
which is considered ‘Good’ and equivalent to a ‘C+’ grade;
for student participants, the average SUS score was 83.1,
which falls just short of being considered ‘Excellent’, and is
equivalent to an ‘A’ grade.
Although the SUS is intended to be a measure of ease-of-
use, Lewis and Sauro argue that it can also be used as a
measure of learnability (using items 4 and 10 of the SUS)
[14]. As with calculating the SUS score, learnability can be
calculated to give a score ranging from 0-100. The average
learnability for this initial trial was 82.9, which falls just
short of ‘Excellent’ and would be given an ‘A’ grade. The
remaining 8 items are what Lewis and Sauro call a measure
of usability [14]. For the current initial trial, this score was
77.8, which is also considered ‘Good’ and would be given a
‘B+’ grade.
5.3 Responses to Open-Ended Questions
Participants’ answers to the three open-ended questions were
categorised into several themes. This qualitative data analy-
sis involved two researchers independently coding user com-
ments to identify common themes, supported by quotations.
These researchers then came together to assess agreement
and categorised themes based on a well-established defini-
tion of usability (ISO-9241), which consists of effectiveness
(usefulness), efficiency (ease-of-use), and satisfaction.
5.3.1 Perceived usefulness
1. Money saving. Most participants mentioned the ben-
efit of there being no transaction fees. They pointed
No. of transactions PIN errors Code1 errors Code2 errors Total code errors Average time (seconds)
S1 30 2 0 8 (26.7%) 8 (26.7%) 30.9
S2 28 3 9 (32.1%) 0 9 (32.1%) 24.4
S3 18 3 2 (11.1%) 8 (44.4%) 10 (55.6%) 28.1
S4 22 0 9 (40.9%) 1 (4.6%) 10 (45.5%) 44.9
S5 29 1 1 (3.5%) 0 1 (3.5%) 24.2
S6 26 1 0 1 (3.9%) 1 (3.9%) 54.3
S7 26 0 1 (3.9%) 0 1 (3.9%) 50.9
S8 28 0 5 (17.9%) 0 5 (17.9%) 32.4
S9 10 0 0 4 (40.0%) 4 (40.0%) 28.8
S10 29 1 0 0 0 37.1
S11 8 2 0 0 0 42.1
S12 22 0 5 (22.7%) 0 5 (22.7%) 38.9
Table 1: The frequency and types of errors made by student participants and the percentage of each partic-
ipant’s transactions that their errors affected
No. of transactions PIN errors Code1 errors Code2 errors Total code errors Average time (seconds)
M1 58 2 0 4 (6.8%) 4 (6.8%) 40
M2 61 0 0 6 (9.8%) 6 (9.8%) 43.9
M3 58 2 0 4 (6.8%) 4 (6.8%) 69.8
Table 2: The frequency and types of errors made by merchant participants and the percentage of each
participant’s transactions that their errors affected
out that this would be useful for those in poor com-
munities, as well as being attractive to price-sensitive
customers and merchants. Aside from helping users
avoid transaction fees, one participant mentioned that
it also meant they did not have to use a smartphone,
making DigiTally even more cost-friendly.
2. Network independent transactions (interoper-
ability). Many mentioned the benefit of not having
to rely on network coverage. For some, this made the
DigiTally transaction process seem more reliable. It
also makes it more predictable as users do not have to
wait for a confirmation SMS, which with M-Pesa can
take up to 30 seconds.
3. Security. The general consensus was that DigiTally
seemed very secure. The codes were a major factor
behind this perception. While recognising this benefit,
a few participants suggested that the codes were too
long, and recommended that the developers consider
shortening the codes.
4. Money tracking. Participants liked being able to
review their last transaction and balance. For some,
however, this was not enough. It was suggested that
this feature would be more useful if the user could
review all previous transactions.
5.3.2 Perceived ease-of-use
1. Ease. Participants perceived DigiTally to be simple
and easy to use. Some clarified that DigiTally was
easy to use after a learning period. One merchant de-
scribed the process as cumbersome; this merchant was
both serving customers and taking payments. Other
merchant participants were either less busy or were
dedicated cashiers. One participant also stated that
DigiTally might be harder to use for the elderly and
those with poor eyesight.
2. Learnability. DigiTally was most often praised for its
learnability; in general, participants felt like DigiTally
was easy for a first-time user to understand. Even the
busy merchant (M3) who had complained that the sys-
tem was cumbersome said she had no difficulty train-
ing a staff member to use it. The same merchant also
warned that learnability might be lower for some, in-
cluding the target population, where there might be
more illiteracy and less education more generally. An-
other merchant was curious to know how money would
be deposited in a production DigiTally system (this
merchant is already an M-Pesa agent).
3. Speed. Participants found transacting with DigiTally
to be relatively fast, once they knew the process. Two
out of the eight merchants said that DigiTally had too
many steps and was time-consuming compared to cash
or M-Pesa. Requiring as much effort from the mer-
chant as from the customer to give and receive codes
was problematic when the merchant had a lot of cus-
tomers and needed to perform other tasks at the same
time. One merchant also did not like having to search
for the customer in their contacts list. One participant
pointed out that the speed of transaction would be less
of an issue in rural areas.
4. Errors and recoverability. One participant stated
that it is hard to make errors that would cause the
user to lose money, and that they found errors easy to
rectify. Many others did not agree. In general, error
reset was considered too difficult. Although the pro-
cess for error recovery was perceived as cumbersome,
none of the users had to go through it during the trial.
See section 6.2 for more details.
5. Cashlessness. Two participants noted that by using
DigiTally they would not need to carry cash around.
This was considered convenient. It was also noted that
merchants do not have to find the exact change when
dealing with customers using DigiTally. This bene-
fit is shared with other electronic payment systems;
Kenyans already like M-Pesa as it dispenses with the
risk and the inconvenience of cash.
6. Codes. Although many did not have much of a prob-
lem with the codes, finding them short enough and
necessary for security, some stated that they did not
like them, mostly because the code or the process was
too long or awkward. Having to exchange and input
codes was also perceived as an opportunity to make
errors. On the other hand, one of DigiTally’s per-
ceived advantages was the deterministic nature of the
transactions, because exchanging the codes provided
immediate feedback that a transaction was completed,
without needing to wait for an SMS.
7. Distance. Sending money to a remote payee was iden-
tified as a potential problem. It was pointed out that
errors could be more likely and recovering from them
would be harder if users were trying to complete a
transaction at a distance.
5.3.3 Satisfaction
1. Likeability. Participants liked using DigiTally, using
words like ‘happy’, ‘good’, ‘best’, ‘seamless’, ‘enjoy’,
‘enthusiasm’, ‘encouraging’, ‘smart’, and ‘satisfied’ to
describe their experience. Comments suggest that lika-
bility could be improved by targeting issues associated
with the length of the codes and with recovering from
errors.
2. Other services. In addition to a merchant who wanted
to know how to do cash-in and cash-out transactions,
one student participant also indicated that they would
like to be able to do this using DigiTally. We did not
provide cash-in and cash-out services during the trial.
6. OBSERVATIONS
We describe in the following sections our observations dur-
ing the preliminary study. These observations were docu-
mented during regular visits to merchants to answer their
questions, and during daily visits to reimburse merchants
for their DigiTally transactions (as discussed in section 4.3).
We highlight two important observations, visual cues and
the error-recovery process, and discuss the lessons learned.
6.1 Visual Cues
We observed that participants chose to display the codes so
that the other participant could see them and enter them
into their own device. None of the participants indicated
that they exchanged the codes verbally, and some stressed
that visual exchange is easier. In crowded areas, a verbal ex-
change of the codes could lead to misheard digits. The cafe-
teria is a crowded environment with long lines of customers,
where a window separates the cashier and the customer and
a small opening at the bottom of the window allows exchang-
ing cash or passing cards (Figure 10). In this environment,
we observed multiple DigiTally transactions where the only
verbal exchange was to acknowledge that a transaction was
completed by saying “it’s OK ”, and in some cases just a
Figure 10: The cafeteria cashier (recipient) is oper-
ating the phone on the left, while a student partici-
pant (payer) is displaying Code2 through the window
to authorise the payment
Figure 11: Participants displaying the back of their
phones (yellow DigiTally label shown on the back)
nod. When we mentioned this observation, most partici-
pants agreed that “it’s much easier”, and gave the exam-
ple of the cafeteria. In general, once participants had some
experience with the system, we noticed that they would al-
ways show the code and never speak it even in quiet areas.
In the transaction flow people developed, visual cues were
used to complete each major step, starting with the cus-
tomer declaring that they want to use DigiTally by showing
a yellow label on the back of the phone that identifies the
participant by name (Figure 11). However, we should not
neglect the fact that some users in the target population for
financial inclusion might be visually impaired.
6.2 Error Recovery
We designed error recovery to prompt the user for three
dummy inputs (any sequence of digits) to ensure that they
were fully aware that they were indeed resetting the saved
transaction data; in our implementation, a wrong reset could
lead to inconsistent states on the SIMs involved. Inconsis-
tent states currently require a ‘hard reset’ of the relationship
between the two users by deleting the contact information
and creating a new contact on each phone.
Before each prompt for Code2, the recipient is shown a con-
firmation of the transaction details. After the dummy in-
puts are provided, the session is reset by discarding Code1
as well as any intermediate results that were saved for val-
idating Code2. Now the recipient (merchant) can start a
fresh transaction: the next time a transaction is initiated
between the same two parties, a new Code1 is generated.
Even with default-text entry enabled in the applet to fill in
the previously entered code, participants requested an easier
way to rectify a mistake.
As error recovery was performed only by one student par-
ticipant during the actual trial, most were likely evaluating
the training they received rather than anything they actu-
ally did. Two users needed to reset a transaction during
training. One participant commented: “For the error issue:
I think you should make it simpler to correct the error and
provide instructions on how to correct it once the error is
made since you will not be around to show them. For ex-
ample, when an error of different amounts that needs one
to put code 1 three times, I think you should write ‘repeat
code 1 three times to correct the error’.” The other partici-
pant agreed: “If there’s a simpler way of resetting a wrongly
transacted code DigiTally will be better.” None of the other
participants, including the merchants, had to use this error-
recovery method, likely due to the training component in-
structing users to agree on the amount before proceeding
with the transaction. We emphasised the importance of this
step; perhaps the ‘burden’ of going through the error recov-
ery process helped motivate careful exchange of the codes.
Our prototype error-recovery mechanism needs a redesign.
A simple alternative would be a menu option to reset trans-
action data, requiring authentication with the user’s PIN
rather than requiring them to enter dummy inputs.
7. DISCUSSION
This paper reports the results of a preliminary study with an
early prototype of DigiTally, tested on participants from a
university in Nairobi. We described how DigiTally involves
sharing two 8-digit codes to protect users from unauthorised
payments while at the same time allowing them freedom
from reliance on network coverage. This has an advantage
that the payment service operator has no marginal trans-
action costs and can offer zero fees for some transactions.
However, the code-sharing process has always presented a
possible usability challenge. To test this and other aspects
of this early prototype, DigiTally was introduced to Kenyan
participants in order to identify and resolve any major us-
ability issues before a later field trial with a more represen-
tative sample of service users.
The errors made in sharing codes suggest a need to make
recovery from this type of error more intuitive. Nevertheless,
most participants completed the task with few code-sharing
errors. The average speed for every student was less than a
minute, and overall the average transaction speed was close
to half a minute. Given our observations of participants
and the comments they made, it seems that the process,
overall, seemed straightforward and fast. The SUS scale
gives insight into the extent to which DigiTally’s usability
might inhibit its use. One of the lessons learned was the
need to demonstrate clearly to users: (a) how errors can be
avoided; and (b) how the codes prevent cheating.
Observations with initial trial users and open-ended answers
following the trial indicate that users’ main fear is the diffi-
culty of recovery from errors. This is already an issue for M-
Pesa when people send payments to the wrong phone num-
ber (it is a well-known problem, and one of the authors ex-
perienced it first-hand). Recoverability is especially impor-
tant in the initial trials and adoption phase of a new system
because expert help will not be available in remote villages;
users’ ability to figure out how to recover from mistakes may
well be the difference between their adopting DigiTally and
rejecting it.
Higher SUS scores tend to predict loyalty and word-of-mouth
recommendations [18]. Users with scores over 80 (c.f. the
average score of 83.1 for student participants) are called
‘Promoters’ because they are more likely to recommend a
system, while users with a score below 60, called ‘Detrac-
tors’, are more likely to say negative things about a system.
DigiTally is in a position to create ‘Promoters’, especially
when it comes to student participants.
There are various things we can do to make DigiTally more
usable for busy merchants. For example, we can give mer-
chants a smartphone app that reads the customer’s phone
number from a QR code on a sticker on their phone, dis-
play Code1, and read Code2 from their phone screen. This
way the merchant does no more work than with M-Pesa.
Two of the merchants preferred DigiTally to M-Pesa be-
cause of speed; DigiTally does not force a cashier to wait for
up to half a minute while a payment confirmation makes its
way through Nairobi’s congested mobile network. DigiTally
takes more keystrokes, but the outcome is then immediate.
The fact that DigiTally has zero marginal costs also means
that it can be offered as a zero-fee payment mechanism
between friends and family, like personal cheques in the
UK. Loan clubs, such as Rotating Savings and Credit As-
sociations (ROSCAs) or savings clubs, and money-guards
(used to enforce savings through the commitment of funds),
whether formal or informal, are an important part of the
financial ecosystem in many less developed countries. See
Collins et al. [6] and Banerjee and Duflo [3] for more infor-
mation about financial inclusion and the financial tools used
by the poorest demographics (living on less than $2 a day).
Given our relatively high SUS, learnability, and usability
scores, the challenge is encouraging first time use. The factor
most apparently affecting first time use, based on free-text
responses, was the 8-digit codes. The most frequent sugges-
tion was to remove or reduce them. Although many partic-
ipants were familiar with M-Pesa, and thus sharing an 11-
digit phone number, this is potentially less time-consuming
and error-prone because it is the same number every time
for the recipient (their own phone number) and a single time
entry for the sender. It also requires no input from the re-
cipient, so a merchant can focus on other tasks.
Participants perceived DigiTally to be secure, and the codes
were the reason behind this perception. As mentioned in
section 5.3.1 item 3, participants asked if these codes can
be shortened. However, this would not be possible without
compromising the security of the system. We discuss the
DigiTally protocol, the cryptography, and security parame-
ters and features in the technical paper [4]. A few partici-
pants also requested a better money tracking tool: some par-
ticipants liked that statistics about their transactions were
available (e.g. amounts sent and received as explained in
section 4.4), and some users requested the ability to view
more than just the last transaction (as discussed in section
5.3.1 item 4). This is not a critical issue, as we can engi-
neer the system to include more transactions as allowed by
hardware constraints and storage capacity.
Because migrant remittances are a key application of mobile
payment systems (such as M-Pesa), some of our participants
discussed the possibilities of remote transactions (see section
5.3.1 item 4). We designed DigiTally primarily for face-to-
face oﬄine transactions and not for remote transactions that
would require a medium to exchange the codes. However,
if such a medium exists, then DigiTally codes can be ex-
changed online to process remote transactions. Codes can
be exchanged using SMS or over the phone; they could even
be exchanged by post. DigiTally can be viewed as a platform
to do the cryptographic operations required to process pay-
ments, on users’ phones rather than on a centralised server,
and systems can be built on top of DigiTally to perform re-
mote transactions – relying on the DigiTally SIM to do the
cryptography.
DigiTally was praised for being quick, easy to use, and easy
to learn. Kenyans are already familiar with M-Pesa, which
DigiTally was designed to mimic; that may have helped di-
rectly, while other factors our subjects liked, such as being
able to review transactions, may have been features that
they would like to see in M-Pesa. Therefore the results in
this paper do not measure how DigiTally would be perceived
by users who have never used any mobile payment system.
But M-Pesa, like most mobile payment systems, cannot work
oﬄine, and therefore fails to provide service to the poorest
communities. Just as M-Pesa appealed most strongly to
people with phones but no payment cards, so also DigiTally
should appeal most strongly to people with no network ser-
vice at all.
This was confirmed when we made two field trips to scout
possible sites for a second-round field trial. When we vis-
ited a small town near Nairobi with good network coverage,
stakeholders were interested in playing with the system, but
saw its main benefit as being potentially programmable so
that it could support their specific applications. When we
visited Busia, a rural community near Lake Victoria with
very poor network coverage, stakeholders were delighted,
and played with it for hours. They considered DigiTally
to be just what they needed to solve their problems with
network coverage and reduce transaction costs.
8. CONCLUSION
We designed and developed an early prototype of DigiTally,
an oﬄine phone payment system, and tested it on Kenyan
participants in a preliminary study. In addition to error
rates, transaction speed data, and SUS scores, we reported
on supporting data from demonstration sessions (observed
behaviours and comments) and free-text written responses
at the end of the study. Our results indicate that partici-
pants found DigiTally easy to use and that they liked key as-
pects of the system, including its perceived security and that
it did not require network coverage to process payments.
We have demonstrated that DigiTally can be used for mak-
ing payments without network coverage or transaction fees.
Some specific technical improvements are needed, most no-
tably the process of recovery from errors. We discovered
that while DigiTally is slightly less convenient to use than
existing mobile payment systems, the added burden is not
excessive; people in areas with poor network coverage are ea-
ger to use it. Furthermore, the burden mostly falls on mer-
chants, and busy merchants are likely to have enough money
to buy better terminals. There is a realistic prospect of de-
veloping DigiTally into a workable system that will extend
mobile payments to the millions of people who are currently
excluded from the world of electronic payments.
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